Even when a person (V) appears to have consented to another person (D) crossing a boundary set by her (V's) interests, we sometimes treat V's apparent consent as ineffective. This may either be because the law does not permit consent to validate the actions concerned, or because V's consent is undermined by the presence of additional factors which render it insufficiently autonomous to be effective. Although efforts have been made to categorise and systematically analyse the additional factors in play in the latter set of cases, so far they have not yielded any measure of normative or doctrinal consonance.
For Beyleveld and Brownsword, the appropriate description of the baseline relationship depends on the context. Where the first description is appropriate, to consent is to exercise a power (which exists in addition to the right-duty relationship), and where the second description is appropriate, to consent is to effect a change internal to the right-duty relationship. They make similar findings in relation to alternate cases in which the baseline relationships between V and D are either privilege and no-right; power and liability; or immunity and disability.
Although the appropriate description of the baseline relationships between V and D may depend on the context of the relationship, the Hohfeldian nature of the ability to validly consent remains the same -it is always a power. The appropriate description of the baseline relationship changes only whether the power is external to the baseline relationship, or an integral part of it. As a useful shorthand then, I will take the ability to validly consent to be a Hohfeldian power. By consenting, V alters the jural relations between herself and D.
7

I.2 Granting consent
If the ability to validly consent is a power, then the necessary conditions for its exercise are to be found in the necessary conditions, if any, for the exercise of a power. For Hohfeld, when a given legal relation changes due to some superadded fact or group of facts which are under the volitional control of a human being, the person whose volitional control is paramount is said to possess the 7 See also in this connection note 4, supra. For the purposes of this study, I need not adopt a strong stance on the identity of the jural relations altered or created. It suffices for me to say that the exercise of the power to consent alters some jural relations of the consenter with others, in a context-specific way. 5 power to effect that change. 8 This suggests that in Hohfeld's view at least, the exercise of power involves an exercise of volition -the active making of a choice. This is a widely accepted view, 9 and it is the view that I adopt here.
As with any choice, in order for the chooser to truly have authorship over the choice, the choice must be hers, and not forced upon her by someone else. This connects with Hurd's and
Alexander's identification of consent's 'moral magic' as flowing from its being an exercise of autonomy. 10 Accordingly, for consent to be morally (and to the extent that the law follows morals, argue that consent is a mental state of choice or authorisation rather than mere desire.
Peter Westen, The logic of consent: The diversity and deceptiveness of consent as a defense to criminal conduct
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 28-34 seems to disagree. However on closer examination, the disagreement disappears. Since Westen understands mental states of desire as being the product of choice, he too accepts the volitional basis of consent; and Westen's assumption that Alexander necessarily requires one to be aware of one's entitlement to withhold consent in order to give valid consent is probably wrong. Alexander's assertion that V consents when she forgoes her moral objection to D's boundary crossing ('Moral Magic (II)', 166) was made in response to Hurd's affirmation that for V to consent she must positively invite, rather than merely be indifferent to, D's boundary crossing ('Moral Magic', (130) (131) . He did not need to take, and should not be read as having taken, the firm position that V must be aware of her moral objection to D's boundary crossing in order to forgo it. In fact Alexander and Westen are agreed that indifference can amount to consent, and Alexander's argument against Hurd would stand even if he substituted the words 'forgo one's moral objections, to the extent that, as a matter of law (whether or not one is aware of it), one has any' for the words he actually uses, viz. 'forgo one's moral objections', but of course, such a cumbersome qualifier was superfluous to the argument being made. Nevertheless Westen's point about being able to consent without being aware of one's legal power to consent stands, and a more technically correct stipulation of the act of consenting would be choosing to forgo one's moral objections, to the extent that, as a matter or law (whether or not one is aware of it), one has any. 6 legally) transformative, the choice made while exercising the power to consent needs to have been made with a sufficient amount of autonomy to morally attribute it to the chooser.
Because nothing of significance to this paper turns on them, I will not express any opinion on the various other disputed questions that arise in relation to the granting of consent. Specifically, I will not address questions relating to whether consent necessarily requires that the consenter invite the boundary crossing, and whether purely a subjective state of mind can create effective consent.
II. Consent and the Elements of an Offence
We begin by considering how actual and putative consent works in the criminal law. Most theorists agree that the presence or absence of actual or putative consent makes a difference either to whether the actus reus of an offence has occurred, or whether the defendant caused it with the requisite mens rea, or perhaps, both. However, there remains considerable dispute as to the specifics, and as to whether consent performs different structural functions in the context of different offences. I will consider the main questions arising in the context of actual and putative consent separately and propose my own working conclusions.
II.1 Actual Consent
If the individual's autonomy is fundamental to liberalism, and an individual's autonomy over her interests entitles her to consent to another's crossing of a boundary set by these interests, then actual consent, 11 given prior to, or contemporaneously with, the impugned action, negates the occurrence of a 'qualifying harm' meriting state attention. Translated into criminal law terms, this means that prior or contemporaneous actual consent negates the actus reus of the offence, instead of providing a supervening defence to criminal liability. 12 In a liberal state, actus reus stipulations for harm-7 predicated offences 13 are either implicitly or explicitly premised on the absence of consent, and when there is consent, this premise falls, and the actus reus of the offence is not performed.
This assertion is far from uncontroversial, and yet discussion on the issue has often missed the point being made, especially in the context of rape, where the sensitive nature of the offence sometimes appears to skew the argument. George Fletcher for instance argues that V's non-consent
is not an element of the offence of rape, but rather, her actual consent is a defence. 14 For him, when D commits the presumptive wrong of sexual penetration, he 15 may be called to answer for his actions to the polity, but consent functions "as a ground for regarding the sexual act as a shared expression of love rather than as an invasion of bodily integrity". Antony Duff argues that Fletcher's stance is implausible. He concedes that a general prohibition on sexual penetration is coherent, but says that "it makes no moral sense to citizens of contemporary liberal democracies: we should not have to answer, to our fellow citizens through the criminal courts, for every act of sexual penetration". 16 For him therefore, 'absence of consent' is an element that must be 'present' to detail slightly later. Beyleveld and Brownsword take a stance that appears to be more generalised. They assert that, At its root, the disagreement between Fletcher and Duff is on the sense in which they understand the unqualified term 'sexual penetration'. For Fletcher it is presumptively nonconsensual, and therefore consent is a defence. For Duff, it seems to be presumptively consensual, and therefore it is anti-liberal to demand that all persons engaging in sexual penetration should answer to the polity, through the criminal courts, for every act of sexual penetration. If my reading of Duff is correct, then both sides are wrong: the mere statement that D sexually penetrated V does not reveal anything about V's attitude towards the sexual penetration. In other words, the act description 'sexual penetration' is neutral as to consent. Sexual penetration with consent does not violate the autonomy of the person consenting to the penetration, and so it is not a qualifying harm.
On the other hand, sexual penetration without consent is certainly a presumptive wrong.
Analytically therefore, in a liberal state, there are two stages of inquiry before an act is identified as a presumptive wrong, for the commission of which the actor may be called upon to answer to her fellow citizens in a criminal court. We know that a perfectly liberal state can legitimately ask a subject to explain her actions only if they have an effect on the interests of another, and so instances of pure self-harm (or indeed self-help), are nobody else's business.
9
Therefore V has an 'in-principle' moral complaint against D only if D's actions affect V. This is not to suggest that every action that has an effect on the interests of others is a presumptive wrong, or that there is any general prohibition on acting in such a manner. Liberal respect for autonomy is compatible with allowing a person to consent to boundary crossings, and so even where V has an in-principle moral complaint, there is no qualifying harm if she validly consents. The initial stage of inquiry is therefore restricted to establishing the in-principle moral complaint. Thereafter, a second level of inquiry must determine whether, if consent could in principle have legalised the boundary crossing, there was valid consent. 19 It is only after the impossibility or absence of valid consent to an action grounding an in-principle moral complaint is established, that the action concerned becomes a qualifying harm or a presumptive wrong, and only at this stage can a liberal state require a citizen to answer to her fellow citizens, through the criminal court, for her action.
If my analysis is correct, then there is no structural difference between rape and any other offence involving harm to another's interests (and to which consent is a 'defence'). 20 The distinction is only that in the definition of rape and other sexual offences, the generally implicit requirement of the absence of consent for the actus reus of an offence, is made explicit.
This approach to prior actual consent also means that once V consents, D's attitude towards the consent is irrelevant to the commission of the actus reus. As a matter of fact, D cannot commit the actus reus of a harm-predicated offence, even when she acts without knowledge of V's consent, or acts in the hope that V was not consenting. At most, it might be possible to argue that in such 19 The term 'inquiry' is something of a misnomer in this context. I have in mind not an inquiry by a criminal court or the polity in any other form. For me, the presence or absence of consent is primarily a matter of self-assessment by the person whose interests are affected.
20 I use the term 'defence' colloquially here. Unless otherwise specified, for the rest of this piece I will be confining my comments to harm and offence predicated offences to which consent is, in the loose sense, a defence.
cases D attracts attempts liability.
21
II.2 Putative Consent
Where D acts on the basis of an incorrect belief that V has consented, the qualifying harm, or presumptive wrong, has occurred. This usually coincides with the satisfaction of the actus reus requirements of an offence stipulation. Consider the offence of rape. The actus reus of rape expressly stipulates that consent must be absent, and where D has intercourse with V incorrectly believing that she has consented, the actus reus of rape undoubtedly occurs. V's apparent consent in such a case may be characterised as putative consent.
D commits the prima facie offence of rape when he authors the actus reus elements with the mens rea required in respect of each of them. Where D believes that V consents to intercourse, he does not possess the requisite mens rea with regard to the absence of V's consent. 22 He therefore does not possess the necessary mens rea to commit rape, and need not offer a supervening defence.
In some ways, rape, with its express stipulation as to the absence of consent, is the easy case for analysing prior putative consent. Most offence stipulations do not expressly require the absence of consent as an element of the actus reus. Nevertheless, if I am right in saying that a liberal criminal system always incorporates at least an implicit 'absence of consent' actus reus stipulation for harm-predicated offences, then it follows that even for offences without an express 'absence of consent' stipulation, D's successful claim that she acted in the mistaken belief that V was consenting negates a mens rea element required for the offence. This approach to analysing the role of consent in offence definitions simplifies the analysis considerably, and in my view, does so correctly. 
12
(1) the capacity or (2) the opportunity for meaningful choice", a putative consenter who lacks the capacity or opportunity for meaningful choice in consenting fails to give valid consent.
25
Hurd describes her approach to dealing with the factors that undermine consent as her 'second identity thesis', viz. that there is symmetry between the ways in which criminal or tortious liability is defeasible despite the fulfilment of the requirements of the prima facie offence, and the ways in which consent is defeasible despite it having prima facie been accorded. She expressly caveats that her second identity thesis is only a tentative proposal, and that the question is a complicated one. Nevertheless she claims that "there is considerable plausibility to the claim that the conditions of criminal responsibility are identical to the conditions under which a person should be deemed sufficiently autonomous to exercise the moral magic of consent".
26
Hurd's argument rests entirely on analogy and intuition -she states her hypothesis, and relies on the intuitive appeal of the analogy to substitute an explanation for why it is correct. But although analogies are good tools to illustrate an argument, they are poor at making the argument.
There is no philosophical basis to say that consent -which is an instance of the exercise of autonomy, mirrors criminal responsibility -which depends on several factors in addition to the capacity to exercise of autonomy. Moreover, Hurd's own cursory attempts at fleshing out the system of consent generated by the second identity thesis 27 raise intuitive doubts about its plausibility. Even Larry Alexander, with whom she set out to write her paper, rejects the second identity thesis and presents a radically different model to deal with the (more limited) question of how coercion defeats consent. Alexander points out that there is no wrong in consenting that needs to be excused, and that therefore there is no way to calibrate the level of threat required to vitiate consent with the different acts to which one might consent, in the manner that one might compare the level of threat required would be found to have been raped if she consented because of the threat of a pinch, and argues that therefore "[n]ot all nonconsensual sex should be regarded as a serious crime". 32 Perhaps this is an unnecessary concession to have made. It strikes me that in most cases, a jury simply will not believe that a person was coerced into having sex against her will because she was threatened with a pinch.
But even if they did, and it was found that consent was vitiated, a defendant might credibly claim lack of mens rea on the basis that he didn't believe that the victim's consent to sex was caused by the threat of a mere pinch, and therefore, he acted on the basis of putative consent. In the unlikely event 14 that the jury believes that consent was vitiated, and that the defendant knew it was, then there seems to be no reason to treat this instance of non-consensual sex any less seriously than one would treat any other instance of non-consensual sex. That apart, Alexander's model seems to be far more intuitively appealing than Hurd's more general proposal.
However, Alexander's model addresses only the special case of coercion -it does not claim to compete with Hurd's proposal in terms of scope, and does not set out a general framework to explain the manner in which apparent consent is undermined. Thus it provides no guidance as to instances in which putative consent is induced inappropriately, by means such as fraud and undue influence. Perhaps, as Burra suggests, it is futile to look for such an overarching explanation for the manner in which prima facie consent is undermined, since the reasons for which different nonconsensual acts are wrong are different, and 'domain-specific'. 33 However, Burra's insight that no single rule can exhaustively explain all situations in which consent is undermined, does not necessarily rule out the existence of a framework for approaching the question. It may just be that within the same framework, different standards apply in different domains.
It would be useful to reconsider this possibility after drawing out the implications of the proposals made in this paper for the undermining of consent. The two stage inquiry proposed in §II.1 for when an act amounts to a presumptive wrong suggests that D commits a presumptive wrong when (1) she crosses a boundary set by V's entitlement (let's call it 'X'), and (2) V does not consent to this crossing. We can unpack the second stage test in terms of the explanation of consent proposed in §I.2. Accordingly, V does not consent when she does not exercise her power to consent, or when she is insufficiently autonomous in exercising it. We see now that although a presumptive wrong may be committed when D usurps V's power to grant or withhold consent in respect of X, 34 33 Burra, 'Significance', 11.
34 I use the term 'usurp' in a more morally loaded sense than 'boundary crossing'. D usurps V's power to consent in respect of entitlement X when D snatches and exercises that power instead of V. D crosses a boundary set by X both 15 this is not a necessary condition for the commission of a presumptive wrong. The presumptive wrong may also, for instance, be committed when D forces V to exercise her power to consent to the boundary crossing. In such a case, although D does not usurp V's power to grant or withhold consent in respect of X, she does usurp V's autonomy over how to exercise her power over X.
This last point will become clearer as the argument unfolds, but if it is correct, it suggests that V's apparent consent 35 is vitiated either when she does not actually exercise the power to consent in respect of X in the manner that D treats it as having been exercised, or when her autonomy over how she exercises her power to consent in respect of X is usurped. We can treat these cases separately, as they negate putative consent in different ways.
III.1 Non-exercise of power to consent
Even where V appears to have granted consent, her seemingly valid exercise of autonomy may be illusory. For instance, an apparent grant of consent may be null and void if V lacks the capacity to exercise the autonomy necessary to grant consent. A person lacks the capacity to make autonomous decisions, and by extension to consent, if she is not a morally responsible agent at the time that she is called upon, or purports, to consent. Conditions of infancy, insanity and automatism defeat a person's status as a responsible agent, and a person cannot, while in the thrall of any of these conditions, exercise the moral autonomy necessary to give genuine consent. 36 No matter what V does, says, or even subjectively decides while sleepwalking, her apparent consent is never real, and although D may be able to raise an absence of mens rea defence based on V's putative consent, she when D usurps V's power to consent in respect of X, and when D deals with X within the scope of V's consent.
35 I exclude from this analysis cases in which V was not given the chance to exercise her power to consent at all -for instance in purse-snatching cases. In such cases, there is not even apparent consent.
36 The standards applicable to determine when an agent is too young, or mentally incapacitated, or devoid of deliberative control, or indeed as will be discussed presently, too intoxicated to exercise her autonomy will depend on the context. For instance, a person may be too young to consent to sex, but may be old enough to consent to medical treatment or the risks inherent in an organised sport.
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cannot negate the actus reus based on the presence of consent. V may of course ratify D's action upon subsequently becoming a responsible agent, but a subsequent ratification is neither philosophically nor functionally equivalent to consenting to it at the time.
37
The same analysis also applies to a person who is too intoxicated to access her rational capabilities. I caveat however, that one need not be in peak decision-making form in order to be morally autonomous, and where intoxication merely disinhibits V, or otherwise affects the efficiency of her autonomous decision-making capacities, V remains morally autonomous 38 and capable of disposing of her interests as she pleases. Her exercise of autonomy, even if performed under these circumstances, is a phenomenological fact, the existence of which cannot be denied.
A far more complex set of cases arise when V's prima facie grant of consent is implicitly or explicitly premised on beliefs that turn out to be false, or expectations that do not materialise. To demonstrate that, consider the following scenarios:
(a) V chooses to consent to conduct which amounts to α, but which she perceives to be something other than α.
37 I cannot defend this assertion in this paper. Briefly however, my view is that if consent is the autonomous exercise of the power to permit a boundary crossing, then ratification, coming as it does after the crossing commences or concludes, does not permit the interference -it waives (to the extent possible) the accrued complaint arising from it.
38 See in this connection the difficult, but correctly decided case of R v. Kingston [1994] 3 WLR 519, in which T, knowing that D had paedophilic tendencies but had hitherto always resisted them, surreptitiously drugged D in order to disinhibit him, and put him in a room with a drugged naked boy. Because of the effects of the intoxication, D gave into temptation, and T filmed D in order to blackmail him. D was held responsible for his actions despite the disinhibiting effect of the involuntary intoxication, and was convicted of an indecent assault on a youth. As Burra, 'Significance', 11, cautions though, the boundary between mere disinhibition and loss of capacity to consent is domain-specific -a person who is too intoxicated to have the capacity to consent to sex, may still be able to permit someone to use her bathroom. In making the general assertion that mere disinhibition does not deprive a person of the capacity to consent, I do not imply that the same evaluative standard of intoxication is relevant in all contexts.
(b) V chooses to consent to conduct α on the condition that circumstance β exists or will exist before or during α. β does not exist before or during α.
(c) V chooses to consent to conduct α, or an act that amounts to α, in the expectation that consequence γ will arise. She may also frame her consent as consent to γ, where for γ to happen, she realises that it is necessary (but not sufficient) that D does α. γ does not happen.
Complex actus reus stipulations in offence definitions are sometimes divided for analytical convenience into conduct, circumstance and consequence elements. The three scenarios described above relate to false beliefs as to the nature of the conduct (α), the existence of circumstances (β) at the time of α, and belied expectations (γ) as to the consequences of α.
Take scenario (c) first. The English case of Linekar 39 is an example of this sort of case. Here a prostitute consented to sex with the defendant on the understanding that the defendant would pay her later. Despite the fact that he did not later pay, the court held that the prostitute had not been 
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V expects γ to occur only consequent to α, then even for V, γ is not a precondition for her consent to α. In other words, the creation of legally valid consent to α is not contingent on the happening of γ, since γ will happen only after α. Moreover, consent cannot be retrospectively created or nullified depending on whether or not certain expected consequences materialise. On the same logic, she can also impose conditions as to the circumstances under which she permits a boundary crossing. Consider an example that conforms to scenario (b). In Assange, 43 V consented to sex with D only if he wore a condom. D had sex with V, but did not wear a condom.
The court rightly ruled that under English law, he had committed rape. It is important to distinguish circumstances -which do or do not exist prior to or contemporaneously with the conduct concerned -from consequences, which, by definition, come into existence subsequently. V can, in the exercise of her autonomy, choose to make the existence of specified circumstances a precondition for consent, but cannot make subsequent consequences a precondition for consent. Of course V can, to some extent, rephrase her expectations as to consequences in terms of circumstances. 
III.2 Usurpation of autonomy over the power to consent
If V does exercise her power to consent by choosing to permit D to cross a boundary set by her primary entitlement X (the 'primary boundary crossing'), she can prima facie be said to consent. Cogan believed that W was consenting to sex when in fact she was not, but had chosen not to resist he had 'consensual' sex with a 13 year old penniless and hungry runaway girl, in exchange for his pocket change.
Although this case is sometimes read as laying down the proposition that consent can be vitiated when it is given under circumstantial pressure, I will suggest in §IV.1 that an alternative explanation based on the violation of a duty not to exploit the girl is more apposite. These examples suggest that at the second stage of the test for a presumptive wrong (which deals with the presence or absence of consent) the focus is indeed upon the victim rather than the person committing the primary boundary crossing, but that apparent consent is only undermined if it is in fact non-existent (due to the apparent consenter's incapacity, or because it is premised on false beliefs as to the nature of the conduct, or the prior or contemporaneous existence of certain We have shifted the focus of the inquiry into when prima facie consent is undermined away from the primary boundary crossing, and towards the usurpation of V's entitlement to choose whether to consent to the primary boundary crossing. Assuming that V has the capacity to validly consent, and does in fact exercise the power to consent, her prima facie consent to the primary boundary crossing is undermined when V's exercise of autonomy over her primary entitlement is unfairly constrained by some person 'Z'.
IV. The 'Common Framework Proposition'
How do we demarcate the scope of the possible unfair constraints on the exercise of autonomy? Hurd unconvincingly suggests that we do so by analysing them in parallel with criminal law defences, including both irresponsibility and supervening defences. 55 A better framework can probably be found outside the criminal law, in the law of contract. For convenience, I will refer to this proposition as the 'Common Frameworks Proposition', or CFP. I suggest the contract law framework because the contract law regime is regularly required to adjudicate on the validity of exercises of autonomous will, and it has developed a jurisprudence that is fairly global, to evaluate the effect of the various constraints that are imposed on autonomous will. In most liberal states, when consent to a contract is induced by fraud, misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence, the contract is voidable. The fact that intuitively this also seems like a plausible list of the unfair constraints on autonomy that undermine consent in the criminal law is not a coincidence -the issue in both areas of law is the undermining of exercises of autonomy, and so the moral instincts applicable in both areas of law are identical. 56 But although the prima facie case for theorising the 54 R v. Cogan & Leak [1976] QB 217.
55 Hurd, 'Moral Magic', [139] [140] 56 Of course, this assertion is contestable. One plausible line of counter argument is as follows: "The orthodox view is that a contract is a reciprocal exchange of promises, which is an inherently performative act. Consent in the criminal undermining of consent in parallel with the undermining of a contract seems plausible, I need to make three caveats, and respond to two immediately apparent difficulties with CFP, at the outset.
The caveats first. Firstly, to the extent that the policy considerations behind the contract law and the criminal law differ, not all rules can be transposed from one context to another. In the discussion that follows, I will flag up some of the instances in which, in my view, different policy considerations require us to apply different rules. However, at this stage it is important to remember that CFP is an argument for identity of approach and not the identity of applicable rules. Secondly, CFP will not generate a description of the content of the rules that operate within the framework.
Therefore while CFP will suggest that coercive pressure should be understood to undermine prima facie consent in the same way in contract and criminal law, it will not itself explain the minutiae of the distinction between legitimate pressure and illegitimate or coercive pressure. Thirdly, it is apparent that different evaluative standards are referred to in deciding whether consent was vitiated for the purposes of civil law and for the purposes of criminal law. In fact, different standards apply even within the criminal law, such that consent granted under a given set of conditions may effectively protect a defendant against a conviction for one offence but not for another. Thus the law may deem a person too intoxicated to consent to sex, but not too intoxicated to consent to a law is not (or at least, is not obviously) based on such a promise. Therefore, the factors that undermine a promise for contract law may well be different from the factors that undermine the (possibly) more subjective exercise of autonomy involved in granting consent". I cannot mount a full rebuttal of such an argument here, but briefly stated, manifests, it remains fair to expect some correspondence between the factors that undermine autonomy in both contract law, and criminal law. Secondly, I do not expect an exact correspondence. As will become clear in the discussion that follows, I recognise that on some issues, the different considerations relevant to contract law and the criminal law will mean that different approaches will be necessarily.
27 handshake or to another person using her bathroom. This idea has been explored in depth by Burra who notes the domain-specific nature of the factors that make non-consensual behaviour wrong.
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This does not however mean that in respect of factors that defeat them, consent in civil and criminal law cannot share the same framework, while referring to different standards. The third caveat therefore, is that CFP is a proposition about frameworks and not about the standards that they incorporate. We turn now to the apparent difficulties with CFP.
For one, contracts induced by unfair constraints on autonomy are not void -they are voidable. In the criminal law, we would probably want to say that consent induced by coercion is void rather than merely voidable. This however, is not a major problem. The civil law notion of voidable contract recognises that a prima facie valid contract has actually been made. Competent parties have reached a meeting of minds on the same thing in the same sense. However, we allow the party that contracted while under the influence of unfair constraints on her autonomy the option of either performing the contract, or avoiding it. In like fashion, when V, being competent to do so, actually exercises her autonomy to permit D to cross the boundary set by her primary entitlement X, this is prima facie a valid exercise of autonomy. Nevertheless when V's exercise of autonomy over X was unfairly constrained, we recognise that the prima facie consent is blemished. The only difference between the position in contract law and in criminal law is that in contract law, by legal fiction, we create for the constrained party the option of treating the contract as valid, whereas in criminal law, we do not. This difference is a matter of (civil law) policy, and does not undermine the in-principle correspondence between the contract law rules and rules of consent.
A second possible area of stress is that there exist factors other than the unfair constraints on autonomy enumerated, that also affect the validity of contracts. Consider for instance, infancy, insanity and mistakes. 58 How do these factors fit into the proposed analogy? But, here too we find 57 Burra, 'Significance', 11.
58 As will be obvious from the caveats made at the beginning of this section, we can set aside cases in which contracts 28 that the correspondence between contract law and criminal law holds up to scrutiny tolerably.
Insanity and infancy go to the capacity to exercise the autonomy necessary both to contract and to consent. Mistakes however, require special consideration. In contract law, generally it is only mistakes about fundamental contractual terms, like the identity of the subject matter of the contract, that are treated as vitiating the contract. Incidental mistakes such as mistakes about the value of goods or services tend not to vitiate contracts. However, I have argued in §III.1 above, that V's consent is undermined by all mistakes as to the nature of the conduct to which consent is given, and all mistakes as to the existence of circumstances, the existence of which were, by an exercise of volition, made preconditions for her consent. Although contract law and the criminal law seem to reach different conclusions, the difference stems from the different policy considerations that apply.
The vitiation of a contract has automatic consequences for both, the party acting under the mistaken belief, and the counter-party, whose behaviour may have been entirely unimpeachable. As a policy matter therefore, the contract law protects the counter-party 59 by limiting the types of mistakes that vitiate a contract. The undermining of consent in criminal law, does not automatically condemn the boundary crosser to criminal liability. She may still be able to raise a mens rea based defence. As such there is no need to artificially narrow the reach of V's powers of autonomy.
These arguments merely dispel some of the obvious objections to CFP. However, the positive case for supporting CFP is best made by demonstrating that it can suggest coherent principles to explain the intuitions that manifest in consent-related criminal law decisions that are not satisfactorily explained by reference to existing criminal law doctrine. I will attempt such a are treated as being void because they run contrary to public policy. Public policy influenced rules exist in relation to the validity of consent in the criminal law as well, but since different policy considerations apply in different contexts, the rules are not likely to be directly comparable.
59 As Randy E. Barnett, "A Consent Theory of Contract", Columbia Law Review 86 (1986) 269, 272-273, 306-307, explains, contract law does not rely solely on a promiser's subjective intent to determine the scope of her promise, because to do so would unfairly prejudice the counter-party. 29 demonstration in respect of two areas of doctrinal uncertainty in the English criminal law.
IV.1 Criminal law consent and contract law principles of undue influence
Although the concept is entrenched in contract law, the English criminal courts have rarely applied the principles of undue influence to the analysis of consent other than in the context of property offences, 60 even though there have been several opportunities to do so, particularly in the context of sexual offences. 61 I will examine two cases that the English Court of Appeal did not analyse in terms of undue influence, and show that much greater doctrinal clarity could have been achieved by using the language of undue influence (which would have been consistent with CFP). 61 Interestingly, Hurd's theory that we understand prima facie consent to be vitiated for the same reasons that we understand prima facie criminal responsibility to be excused would support extant English case law. A defendant is excused of criminal liability only if she can establish a very specific form of undue influence -coercion. Looser notions of undue influence such as abuse of trust and exploitation do not seem to be enough. If it can be shown that undue influence has a role in explaining our intuitions in cases in which we agree that consent is vitiated, then this suggests not only that extant doctrinal law has missed a trick, but also that Hurd's second identity thesis is wrong. person's autonomy in exercising her power to consent is constrained solely by circumstances, her consent is not necessarily vitiated by any unfair constraint on her autonomy. However, as a normative proposition, it seems far from convincing. It leads to counterintuitive results in cases such as the hypothetical case discussed in §III.2; 64 and it does not provide much guidance as to how serious the circumstances must be before they vitiate consent, or whether D should know or is required to inquire about those circumstances. Furthermore, it does not explain why an autonomous individual D, should be required to look out for V's interests when relying on her consent, but not in general. 65 The court's judgment itself is not explicit on the reasoning adopted, but the trial judge summarised the prosecution's case thus:
...the defendant took advantage of a hungry and vulnerable child whom he knew had been abused by his brother and to a lesser extent by himself, which means that she was submitting because her will was overcome through hunger, and I will use the word desperation again, and that say the prosecution is not true consent.
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One has considerable intuitive sympathy for the outcome in Kirk, and in fact the court did probably reach the correct conclusion. However, its conclusion is best explained not on the basis that the circumstantial pressures bearing on the victim vitiated her consent but rather, on a basis drawn from the law of contract. It is fairly well accepted that if consent to a contract was caused by undue influence, then the contract is voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. For an outline of this challenge to a contract, I refer to the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which was drafted by the British and which contains a very accessible summary of the core common law principles relating to undue influence. Where one party (A) is in a position to dominate the will of another (B) and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over B, A uses undue influence to 64 In which V was compelled by her (self-inflicted) financial troubles to sell her beloved car to an unrelated person D. Where A is in a position to dominate the will of B and the contract appears unfair, A is rebuttably presumed to have used her position to obtain an unfair advantage.
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The same approach, if applied to the criminal law would easily explain the decision in Kirk and in fact, the prosecution did implicitly rely on the fact that the defendant was in a position to dominate the will of the victim because (a) the victim was a hungry, vulnerable and desperate child;
(b) the defendant had previously abused her; and (c) the defendant was an adult member of her extended family. Moreover, the defendant knew all of these facts. In such circumstances, it is clear that the defendant was in a position to dominate the will of the child, and the one-sidedness of the 'transaction' that ensued made it apparent that the consent granted was obtained by the exercise of undue influence. Thus inevitably, the consent would be vitiated, and a conviction for rape would result. This analysis provides a better explanation of why we intuitively think it was wrong to treat the child as having actually consented. Even if the defendant had somehow not known of the facts that establish that the child's will was dominated -say if he had been an automaton at the time of acting -we could still plausibly say that the child had not validly consented although we might grant that the defendant would have a mens rea based defence available to him (in addition to the obvious irresponsibility defence). This analysis of the manner in which consent can be said to have Jheeta too can be analysed as a case in which circumstantial pressure vitiated consent.
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In Jheeta too, the outcome reached was probably correct, and again, there is no need to suppose that our intuitions in relation to those facts can only be explained if we accept that circumstances can vitiate consent. states') that V could have towards D's boundary crossing, lie on a single spectrum. These attitudes include actual desire, reluctant acquiescence, and mere submission. According to the court, the criminal law draws a line along this spectrum between reluctant acquiescence (which, along with all more positive attitudes towards the boundary crossing, amounts to valid consent) and mere submission (which, along with more negative attitudes towards the boundary crossing, does not).
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The court was less than clear in identifying the variable that defines this spectrum, but held that the trial judge's characterisation of it as a function of the 'constraints operating on [V's] will' was not a 71 The same reasoning would also explain the decision in a case recounted in R v. Wellard (1978) Since it had already held that there was no need to show that V was put in fear of violence, 75 the court must have been referring to a more general fear of unpleasant consequences. For instance, the court thought that in principle, and depending on V's circumstances, it was possible that her fear of losing a role in a film, or the disclosure of embarrassing information, could vitiate her consent.
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For the court therefore, the difference between actual desire, reluctant acquiescence, and mere submission, was simply the amount of pressure brought to bear on V. Accordingly, it held that juries should be asked to locate the line on the spectrum between mere submission and reluctant acquiescence by "applying their combined good sense, experience and knowledge of human nature and modern behaviour". 77 This line of thinking supports the view that prima facie consent can be vitiated even when the person presenting V with her options is not responsible for causing the unwelcome consequences that would ensue if V refused to submit to the boundary crossing, and even if V's lot was actually improved by having some alternative to these unwelcome consequences.
Consider the facts of Latter v. Bradell, where V, a Victorian domestic servant, having no legal right to further employment, but was offered it on the condition that she consent to an intimate examination to ascertain whether she was pregnant. She submitted, but later sued for assault.
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Some commentators, following the Olugboja line, argue that since V's employment opportunities were likely to be extremely limited, her baseline situation was so poor that even presenting her with the opportunity to improve it by submitting to the examination was arguably coercive. 79 The 74 R v. Olugboja [1982] QB 320 at 327, 332. 37 the amount of pressure exerted on V. It may well be possible to exert far more pressure on V using legitimate commercial bargaining power, than by illegitimate threats of minor vandalism. Even arguing that the distinction depends partly on the amount of pressure exerted on V seems difficult:
given that the criminal law does not generally require one to look out for the interests of others, why should D not be permitted to exert all legitimate pressure he can on V, and instead be restricted only to using moderate pressure? Finally, the contract law approach allows for guidance that is far more precise and easy to apply than the Olugboja guidance. All of this suggests that even in the criminal law, juries considering the effect of causative pressure on prima facie consent ought to be advised in terms of legitimate and illegitimate pressure, 85 instead of unhelpfully asking them to apply their combined good sense, experience and knowledge of human nature and modern behaviour.
IV.3 Fraud and misrepresentation -a reminder of the limits of CFP
These demonstrations of the utility of CFP make a plausible positive case in support of CFP, but it is important not to lose sight of CFP's limitations. I have already mentioned that where the policy objectives of contract law and the criminal law differ, the correspondence between the analytical frameworks they ought to employ will break down. A stark illustration of this is the nontransferability of the contract law's approach to the effect of fraud and misrepresentation on consent to the criminal law. As pointed out in §III.1, in contract law, the voiding of a contract necessarily affects all parties to it. Hence, when one party contracts on the basis of an incorrect belief, a policy concern for the interests of the counter-party means that the law stops short of declaring that the contract is automatically void or voidable. Therefore, a contract is only undermined by causative mistakes about beliefs or terms identified as usually being fundamental to contract, and causative identifies some forms of pressure (threats of violence, and unlawful detention) that give rise to a presumption of non-consent. These forms of pressure are therefore treated as being at least presumptively illegitimate.
38 mistakes induced by a counter-party, either by fraud or misrepresentation.
None of these considerations is relevant to the criminal law, because when V's consent is predicated on the truth of certain beliefs as to circumstances, making a declaration that her consent is non est because of the falsehood of these beliefs does not automatically result in criminal liability for D. D may still raise a mens rea based defence. This is why it is well established that for the purposes of the criminal law, fraud played on V does not necessarily negative her consent. 86 As the court in Richardson explained, "[t]he common law is not concerned with the question whether the mistaken consent has been induced by fraud on the part of the accused or has been self induced. It is the nature of the mistake that is relevant, and not the reason why the mistake has been made". 87 A normative model of how mistakes affect consent has been described in §III.1, and since it addresses all mistakes, however caused, there is no need for special rules addressing the effect of fraud or misrepresentation on consent in the criminal law.
CFP is a tentative proposition, and much more needs to be done to develop it, although I cannot undertake that task here. However if proved, this thesis has a significant pay-off. A proved correspondence between the contract law and criminal law rules of consent would allow us to refer to the well developed contract law jurisprudence to develop answers to many questions relating to when prima facie consent is undermined.
Conclusion
Where the law permits consent to validate a boundary crossing, there is value in segregating the two 86 R v. Richardson [1999] 
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questions involved in determining whether legally valid consent has been given, viz.
1. Did V exercise her power to consent? If so, 2. Was V's choice to exercise that power sufficiently autonomous to be effective?
As has been argued, these questions are answered by reference to different tests and considerations.
Moreover, particularly in the context of the second question the criminal law can learn a lot by looking outside the bounds of its own discipline. It has long been recognised that the concept of consent has importance both in civil and criminal law. Theorists also seem to agree that consent's morally transformative character stems from it being an expression of moral autonomy. Since moral autonomy is not a feature unique to either the criminal law or the civil law, and since it grounds consent in both, it seems almost trite to suggest that there would be deep and abiding links between the way in which consent operates in the civil and the criminal law. Yet courts and theorists have rarely made enough of the common roots of consent in different areas of law. Of the multitude of consent related issues in the criminal law, I picked out just a few test cases to highlight these links.
Of the various branches of civil law, I picked out just the contract law as a source of instruction for the criminal law. Even the very limited study that resulted suggests that the criminal law of consent can benefit greatly from referring to civil law frameworks. It seems likely that much more value can be gleaned by the criminal law of consent through considering the frameworks relating to consent developed by the civil law, including, but not necessarily limited to the law of contract.
